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U NLIKE last year, few significant Texas legislative and administrative
developments affected the practitioner in the corporation and partner-
ship law areas; however, there were many interesting case law develop-
ments during the survey period.
I. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During 1980 the Revision of Corporation Law Committee of the State
Bar's Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law worked on sub-
stantial revisions of the close corporation provisions in the Texas Business
Corporation Act.' The proposed revision, which will be submitted to the
Sixty-seventh Texas Legislature, was drafted in response to a general rec-
ognition that the existing close corporation law2 is not being sufficiently
used.3 Under the proposed law, close corporation status would be ob-
tained simply by electing such status in the articles of incorporation. One
goal of the proposed law is to permit shareholders to operate their corpora-
tion by means of a shareholders' agreement, in a manner similar to a part-
nership. In this way, shareholders can divide among themselves, or even
designate to some third party, the control of the management and opera-
tions of the corporation. The proposed close corporation law would ap-
pear in a new Part Twelve of the TBCA.
Effective April 15, 1980, the Texas State Securities Board adopted a new
exemptive rule under regulatory authority granted to it pursuant to section
5(T) of the Texas Securities Act.4 The new rule exempts certain sales of
securities of $100,000 or more from the registration requirements under
section 7 of the Act,5 provided all the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) The sale is made, without the use of any public solicitation or
advertisements, and to sophisticated, well-informed investors ....
* B.B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone,
Dallas, Texas. The author wishes to acknowledge gratefully the assistance of William L.
Boeing, Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Texas, in the preparation of this Arti-
cle.
1. 18 TEX. ST. B. BULL. SECTION CORP., BANKING & Bus. L. No. 1, Sept. 1980, at 23.
The Texas Business Cororation Act is codified at TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 1.01-
11.01 (Vernon 1980), an is referred to herein as the TBCA.
2. Texas close corporation law is codified at TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1
to -5 (Vernon 1980).
3. See generally Blunk, Analyzing Texas Articles of Incorporation.: Is the Statutory
Close Corporation Format Viable?, 34 Sw. L.J. 941 (1980).
4. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(T) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
5. Id. art. 581-7 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981).
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(B) The minimum purchase of such security by each investor is
$100,000, and such minimum amount must be paid in cash to the is-
suer or his agent at or before the closing of the offering.
(C) No securities of the issuer of the same class . . . can be cur-
rently registered for sale in Texas, and no application to register se-
curities of the issuer of the same class . . . can be pending.
(D) The entire offering. . . must be sold pursuant to exemptions
from the securities registration requirements of the federal securities
laws.
.(E) Issuers who are not registered securities dealers and who do
not sell securities under this subsection by or through registered secur-
ities dealers shall file a sworn notice on Form 133.28 . . . not less than
5 (five) business days prior to the making of an offer claimed to be
exempt .... 6
Persons who purchase under this exemption are not counted as security
holders under section 5(I)(a) 7 or as purchasers under section 5(I)(c) 8 in
determining whether sales to other security holders or purchasers are ex-
empt under section 5(l).9 This regulatory exemption should assist issuers
raising money in Texas through private placements involving large mini-
mum purchases. Its adoption follows a trend of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to exempt from registration and reporting
requirements these types of "institutional" offerings.' 0
Also, as discussed in the section of this Article on Securities Laws, the
Texas Securities Board adopted further revisions of their administrative
rules and regulations during 1980, some of which should prove to be very
helpful to the practitioner.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Partnershos
Joint Ventures. In recent years many cases have been handed down dis-
cussing whether the relationship of the parties constitutes a "joint adven-
ture" or "joint venture," terms that are used interchangeably. In Great
American Mortgage Investors v. Louisville Title Insurance Co. 12 the court
applied the joint adventure doctrine to impute knowledge of deed restric-
tions by a Texas bank to its co-adventurer in a construction financing ar-
rangement. Great American Mortgage Investors (GAMI), headquartered
6. Tex. Blue Sky Reg. 065.05.00.009(I 1), 5 Tex. Reg. 1285 (1980), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 55,557 (1980). Form 133.28 must disclose the issuer's name, address, and state of
incorporation (if applicable); a brief description of the issuer's business plan and the securi-
ties to be sold; and whether any person connected with the issuer (including employees) has
ever been cited or charged according to nine enumerated actions. Id
7. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(I)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
8. Id art. 581-5(I)(c).
9. Tex. Blue Sky Reg. 065.05.00.009(11)(F), 5 Tex. Reg. 1285 (1980), 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 55,557 (1980).
10. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.146(g)(2)(d), .242 (1980).
1I. See notes 136-40 infra and accompanying text.
12. 597 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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in Atlanta, Georgia, entered into a participation agreement with The
Wynnewood State Bank in Dallas for the funding of a construction pro-
ject. Prior to closing, the defendant, the title company, provided the
Wynnewood Bank with a mortgagee information letter dated May 4, 197 1,
containing exceptions to title, including certain deed restrictions. A subse-
quent information letter dated May 12, 197 1, however, did not list the deed
restrictions as exceptions, and a title binder issued on May 17, 197 1, stated
that no deed restrictions were of record. GAMI asserted that it did not
learn of the restrictions until adjacent landowners brought suit to secure
compliance with the restrictions. The resulting costs of compliance caused
the developer to default, and GAMI brought suit against the title com-
pany, alleging negligent misrepresentation. Addressing the title company's
claim in defense that the loan participation agreement constituted a joint
adventure, the court found that: (1) GAMI and the Wynnewood Bank
were co-owners of the loan and thus had the requisite "community of in-
terest"; (2) as Wynnewood Bank was to act as if it were the lender and
because GAMI possessed the right to approve its actions, there was joint
right of control; (3) the participation agreement expressly provided for the
sharing of profits and losses. 13 On these facts, the court concluded that
GAMI and Wynnewood Bank were joint adventurers as a matter of law;
accordingly, the court held that because Wynnewood Bank's knowledge of
the deed restrictions prior to closing of the loan was imputed to GAMI,
GAMI could not have justifiably relied on any misrepresentation to the
effect that no restrictions existed.
14
In Gibson v. Northeast National Bank 15 the court sustained a finding by
the trial court that a trade show operator and a travel agency had formed a
joint venture for a "floating trade show" and, thus, both were liable as
borrowers on a note executed by the trade show operator to the plaintiff
bank.' 6 Gibson, the only joint venturer to appeal, challenged the jury in-
struction that "a joint venture between two or more people means an
agreement, either express or implied, involving a joint or community inter-
est, to share profits, if any, and losses, if any, and to mutually control or
manage the [venture]." 17 The court held that this definition was not in
error and that it was unnecessary to make a specific finding of intent to
enter a joint venture.' 8 Thus, the debt created by one of the defendants for
the use of the joint venture became an obligation of the joint venture, and
both defendants were liable on the note. 19
Partner Liability. In Texaco, Inc. v. Wolfe20 the court dealt with the ques-
tion of the liability of a partner who had withdrawn from a partnership.
13. Id. at 431.
14. Id at 431-32.
15. 602 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
16. Id at 340.
17. Id
18. Id at 340-41.
19. Id at 341.
20. 601 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19811
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Although several rules in partnership law were reiterated, Wolfe primarily
stands for the proposition that creditor suits against partners should be
pleaded carefully. Texaco sued Charles Wolfe and his brother Nick
Wolfe, doing business as Wolfe Construction Company, for amounts due
under a credit card. Charles and Nick Wolfe had been partners in Wolfe
Construction Company from 1971 until August 1973, when Charles with-
drew, and although Charles filed an assumed name certificate stating his
withdrawal, he failed to notify Texaco or any other partnership creditors
of the dissolution of the partnership. The court cited the general rule that,
with respect to a third party doing business with a partnership, each mem-
ber of the partnership is personally or severally liable for the partnership
debts and that such liability continues until the partnership is legally dis-
solved or until actual notice of withdrawal is given by the withdrawing
partner or partners to the partnership creditors.21 The court found that a
partnership between Charles and Nick Wolfe did exist and that Charles
had given no notice to Texaco of his withdrawal therefrom; however, be-
cause the pleadings failed to allege the existence of a partnership and
Charles's liability as a partner, no judgment could be rendered for Texaco
on that basis. 22 Texaco had chosen to sue Charles Wolfe personally, and
had relied strictly on his original credit card application, without pleading
partnership liability in the alternative. 23 The plaintiffs pleading deficien-
cies were clearly the determinative factors in the outcome of the suit.
Rights of Partners. The case of Hughes v. Aycock 24 dealt with the alleged
forced retirement of a partner from a partnership. In Hughes a group of
doctors and dentists formed a partnership to construct and maintain a hos-
pital and medical clinic in which they would practice. Because the plain-
tiff-partner failed to move a substantial portion of his practice to the
facilities after they had been constructed, the partnership advised the
plaintiff in 1975 that he had been retired pursuant to section 8.9 of the
partnership agreement, which provided: "For the purpose of this partner-
ship agreement, the word 'retirement' shall be defined as a situation where:
(b) . . .Partners . . .remove their offices from the clinic which is a
part of the Houston North Hospital complex and/orfail to use the Hospital
itselffor the treatment of their patients. ... 25 The partnership tendered
an amount that it believed represented the fair market value of the part-
nership interest owned by the plaintiff, but on June 20, 1975, the plaintiff
rejected in writing his alleged retirement and the consideration for his in-
terest. The plaintiff continued to receive his share of the profits and losses
until January 1, 1976. In a suit contesting the forced retirement and con-
21. Id. at 740-41; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 35 (Vernon 1970).
22. 601 S.W.2d at 741.
23. Id. The record disclosed that the original credit cards were destroyed and an appli-
cation for new cards did not bear Charles's signature. Thus, because the amount owed was
under the new cards, Charles, as an individual, was not contractually bound to the obliga-
tion.
24. 598 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
25. Id at 372 (emphasis added).
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sideration paid therefor, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court deci-
sion upholding the forced retirement. 26 The court also considered the
plaintiffs assertion of error in not being permitted to elect to receive his
portion of partnership profits, in lieu of interest, from the date of dissolu-
tion until the date of judgment as provided in section 42 of the Texas Uni-
form Partnership Act.27 Although the court noted that the statute did not
dictate when the section 42 election was to be made, and that there was no
prevailing law on the question, it held that the plaintiff was dilatory in
seeking his relief.28 More importantly, the court held that the plaintiff had
failed to carry his burden of proof, not only with respect to the profits
earned by the partnership after dissolution, but also with respect to those
profits that were directly attributable to his capital investment, both of
which were necessary for the section 42 election.29 Consequently, plain-
tiffs election under section 42 was denied. 30
In Dobson v. Dobson 31 the court addressed the issue whether a partner's
actions constituted a waiver of his rights in the partnership. James M.
Dobson, III, and his father, James M. Dobson, Jr., entered into a real es-
tate partnership agreement that provided that the profits and losses were to
be divided seventy-five percent to father and twenty-five percent to son.
The agreement further provided that either partner could retire from the
partnership at the end of any fiscal year, whereupon the remaining partner
would have the right to purchase the retiring partner's interest or liquidate
the business of the partnership. After the father and son had worked to-
gether for a short time, their working relationship deteriorated. On two
occasions the son refused to sign notes to cover construction financing for
partnership property, and in September 1973 he moved to Dallas while his
father continued the partnership business alone. From 1972 to 1976 the
partnership filed tax returns showing the son to be the owner of twenty-five
percent of the partnership property, and the son in turn claimed his
twenty-five percent ownership on his personal tax returns. Additionally,
the father, at his son's request, wrote a letter in 1976 to a Dallas loan of-
ficer confirming the fact that his son owned twenty-five percent of certain
properties of the partnership. In 1977 the son notified his father that he
26. Id at 375. The court noted that because the plaintiff had not moved his practice to
the new facilities as he had stated he would, he could not invoke the equitable defense of
estoppel to prevent his retirement. Id
27. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 42 (Vernon 1970) provides as follows:
When any partner retires ... and the business is continued ... without any
settlement of accounts as between him. . . and the person or partnership con-
tinuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he . . . as against such persons
or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution
ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the
value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option
• . . in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the
property of the dissolved partnership . . ..
28. 598 S.W.2d at 376.
29. Id. at 376-77.
30. Id
31. 594 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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was retiring from the partnership and offered to sell his twenty-five percent
interest. The purchase was never concluded, and the son filed suit for an
accounting and for specific enforcement of the partnership agreement's ter-
mination provisions. The jury found that the son had waived his rights
under the partnership agreement by his failure to pay twenty-five percent
of the losses of the partnership and by his refusal to co-sign partnership
obligations.32 The court of civil appeals, however, found no provisions for
forfeiture or waiver in the partnership agreement and noted that the Texas
Uniform Partnership Act 33 did not provide that waiver or forfeiture of
rights result from the breach of a partnership agreement. 34 The court then
cited with approval cases from other Uniform Partnership Act jurisdictions
holding that a breach did not result in the forfeiture of a partner's inter-
est. 3" Moreover, although no Texas case had decided the issue, the court
found support in several Texas joint venture cases, 36 and concluded by
stating the general rule that "in the absence of explicit provisions in the
agreement to the contrary, a breach of the partnership articles will not
ordinarily cause a partner to lose his interest in the partnership. ' 37 The
court held that under the circumstances, James Dobson, III, did not forfeit
or waive the right to his interest. 38
B. Corporations
The Corporate Fiction. During the summer of 1980 the Texas Supreme
Court decided two cases that should provide some guidelines in the recent
multitude of lawsuits that seek to pierce corporate veils. In Torregrossa v.
Sze/c3 9 the plaintiff Szelc had brought suit against H.E.D. Sales, Inc. and
Allan Torregrossa, a shareholder and officer, for breach of implied war-
ranty of title in a used car that Szelc had purchased. The primary question
before the Texas Supreme Court was whether sufficient evidence sup-
ported the jury finding that H.E.D. Sales, Inc. was the alter ego of Tor-
regrossa, making Torregrossa personally liable for the judgment. The
court reaffirmed the general rule in Texas:
Courts will not disregard the corporation fiction and hold individual
officers, directors or shareholders liable on the obligations of a corpo-
ration except where it appears that the individuals are using the cor-
porate entity as a sham to perpetrate a fraud, to avoid personal
liability, or to avoid the effect of a statute, or in a few other excep-
32. Id at 180.
33. The Act is codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 1-46 (Vernon 1970).
34. 594 S.W.2d at 180-81.
35. Id at 181. The court cited, among others, B.K.K. Co. v. Schultz, 7 Cal. App. 3d
786, 86 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1970); Fisher v. Fisher, 352 Mass. 592, 227 N.E.2d 334 (1967).
36. 594 S.W.2d at 181-82. The court cited Thompson v. Duncan, 44 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved); Lane v. Phillips, 509 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1974, writ refd n.r.e.); Welch v. Brock, 195 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. 594 S.W.2d at 181-82.
38. Id. at 182.




As plaintiff, Szelc had the burden of proof on the issue of alter ego, but the
court found that he had failed to present evidence of a sham corporate
structure.41 Even though Torregrossa occupied an office on the property
and was apparently in a position of authority, nothing indicated that he
was the owner of the business. The court noted that when Szelc purchased
the car he had made his check payable to H.E.D. Sales, Inc., that the bill of
sale was also in the name of the corporation, and that the evidence did not
indicate that corporate formalities were not followed by H.E.D. Sales,
Inc.42 Moreover, the court found that although the corporation was capi-
talized at the minimum statutory amount, the plaintiff failed to show that
this was an unfair device designed to obtain inequitable results. 43 The
court of appeals had cited Tigrett v. Pointer" in support of its holding that
insufficient capitalization was a valid ground to pierce the corporate veil.45
The supreme court, however, quoted the Tigrett opinion, which states that
"'[i]nadequate capitalization by itself may not be a sufficient ground to
pierce the corporate veil,' "46 and distinguished Tigrett, stating that the in-
adequate capitalization in that case came about through a fraudulent
scheme, perpetrated by the major shareholder to acquire virtually all the
corporate assets.47 Because the record showed no evidence of the type of
manipulation found in Tigrett, nor evidence indicating that H.E.D. Sales,
Inc. was the alter ego of Torregrossa, the court held that Szelc could re-
cover nothing from Torregrossa. 48
Conversely, in Sagebrush Sales Co. v. Strauss49 the supreme court re-
versed a judgment of the court of civil appeals and sustained the trial
court's application of the alter ego theory. 50 Sagebrush Sales sold building
materials to Crawford-Strauss Properties, relying on a detailed financial
statement of "Richard C. Strauss, d/b/a Crawford-Strauss Properties."
The financial statement disclosed that Richard Strauss, as an individual,
owned the property for which the building materials were purchased, but
failed to reveal that Strauss operated through a corporate entity. Though
the purchase orders were made on letterhead stating "Crawford-Strauss
Properties, Inc." and were signed by an employee as "Purchasing Agent,"
the court stated that, under the circumstances presented, the letterhead was
40. Id at 804.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id The court noted that the plaintiff failed to show that any unpaid creditors re-
mained and, in fact, that plaintiff presented little evidence concerning the corporate financial
structure. Id
44. 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
45. H.E.D. Sales, Inc. v. Szelc, 596 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.]), rev'd sub nom. Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1980).
46. 603 S.W.2d at 805 (quoting Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375, 382 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
47. 603 S.W.2d at 805.
48. Id
49. 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980).
50. Id at 860.
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insufficient to charge Sagebrush, as a matter of law, with knowledge that it
was contracting with a corporation.5' The court, recognizing that each
case must be determined according to its own facts, cited the general rule
that "personal liability should be imposed on a stockholder only in ex-
traordinary circumstances. . . .One situation wherein personal liability is
imposed is where an individual controls and manages the entity in such a
manner that it becomes his alter ego."'52 The jury findings stated that the
affairs of the respondent entities, owned and controlled by Richard
Strauss, were indistinguishable from Strauss's personal affairs and that
Strauss acted in a manner that would lead Sagebrush Sales reasonably to
believe that the entities in question had reference to him.53 Accordingly,
the supreme court held that the personal judgment against Richard Strauss
was proper under the alter ego doctrine. 54
The State of Texas has assumed the traditional creditor's role in assert-
ing the alter ego doctrine. In State v. Nevitt" the state sued to collect de-
linquent personal property taxes, penalties, and interest that had been
assessed against a corporation, from an individual who was a shareholder
in the corporation. The court held that the alter ego theory was asserted
improperly because the state made no showing of any sham in the transac-
tion claimed. 56 The state then urged the "trust fund" theory, which states
that when a corporation becomes insolvent and ceases to do business, the
officers and directors hold the corporate assets in trust for ratable distribu-
tion to creditors and a failure to do so imposes personal liability upon the
officers and directors.5 7 The court, however, held that the state had failed
to show the absence of a ratable distribution or, for that matter, the value
of any relevant assets; as a result, the court stated that no showing could be
made that an application of assets was not ratable as to the state.58
Parent Liabilityfor Subsidiary. In addition to the aforementioned alter ego
cases, other cases handed down during the survey period involved the lia-
bility of a parent corporation for the acts of its subsidiary. Apparently,
Texas courts have been lenient in permitting recovery against the parent
corporation that uses its subsidiary as a mere instrumentality for con-
ducting the parent's business. In Jetty, Inc. v. Hall-McGuffArchitects5 9 an
architectural firm, Hall-McGuff, sued to recover for its services in connec-
tion with the preparation of plans for an office building project for the
defendants. The defendants asserted that the trial court had rendered
51. Id
52. Id (citations omitted).
53. Id at 860-61.
54. Id. at 861.
55. 595 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App,-Dallas 1980, no writ).
56. Id at 143.
57. Id
58. Id The court noted that it could not make a determination of insolvency from the
limited information in the record. Id. In fact, the court made several references indicating
the record was sparse. Id at 143-44.
59. 595 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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judgment wrongfully against the parent, Jetty-Fagg, Inc., because the writ-
ten contract was between Hall-McGuff and Jetty, Inc., a wholly owned
subsidiary. In response to Jetty-Fagg's contention that insufficient evi-
dence existed to show that its subsidiary was a mere conduit for the par-
ent's business, the court noted that Jetty, Inc. had a complete unity of
officers and directors with Jetty-Fagg, and that Jetty-Fagg paid for all
work done by Hall-McGuff. 60 Additionally, Jetty, Inc. was a minimally
capitalized corporation that had not engaged in any business up to that
time, and all its decisions were made by officers of Jetty-Fagg. Concluding
that sufficient evidence existed to hold that Jetty, Inc. was a mere conduit
of Jetty-Fagg, the court cited the rule that "where management and opera-
tions are assimilated to the extent that the subsidiary. . . is simply a name
or conduit through which the parent . . .conducts its business, the
corporate fiction may be disregarded to prevent fraud or injustice." 6'
Likewise, in Cupples Coiled Pipe, Inc. v. Esco Supply Co. 62 plaintiff Esco
sued Cupples Coiled Pipe, Inc. (CCP) and Cupples Company Manufactur-
ers (CCM) for damages resulting from the manufacture and sale of defec-
tive pipe. CCP was a subsidiary of CCM, and, at the time the defective
pipe was sold by CCP in 1974, CCP had interlocking directorates and
identical presidents and vice presidents with CCM. At the end of 1975
CCP went out of business and sold its remaining assets for approximately
$330,000, evidenced by a promissory note from the buyer. CCP then as-
signed the note to CCM as a credit on prior indebtedness, and thereby
CCP became, for all practical purposes, a corporate shell. The court first
found that, because the action involved strict liability for a defective prod-
uct under tort law, the loss would be allocated to the parent when its sub-
sidiary became insolvent.63 Secondly, the court stated that the record
indicated that CCM exercised such control over the operations of CCP
that Esco was placed in a position of disadvantage by inequitable means
that could be labeled constructive fraud.64 Finally, the court held that the
issue was submitted properly to the jury to justify a finding of liability
under the law of agency.65
Authority of Corporate Officers. The limits of a corporate president's pow-
ers were discussed in Robert Nanney Chevrolet Co. v. Evans & Moses. 66
James Austin was a majority shareholder of Robert Nanney Chevrolet Co.
and had personally endorsed certain of the corporation's debt documents.
When the corporation encountered financial problems, Austin feared for
his personal funds and commenced to liquidate the corporation. The cor-
porate president, Robert Nanney, hired the defendant law firm to thwart
60. Id at 921.
61. Id (quoting Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975)).
62. 591 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
63. Id at 618.
64. Id.
65. Id at 619.
66. 601 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
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the liquidation and signed a corporate check for the $2,000 fee. The bank,
however, returned the check for lack of a countersignature, and the law
firm sued the corporation for its fee. The court held against the law firm,
stating that Robert Nanney had no direct authority from the board of di-
rectors to sign the check without a countersignature. 67 Moreover, accord-
ing to the court, the hiring of counsel in an attempt to thwart the will of a
majority of the board of directors and stockholders was not a routine mat-
ter arising in the ordinary course of business and, therefore, was not within
the inherent power of a corporate president.68
In Crisp v. Southwest Baneshares Leasing Co. 69 Southwest Bancshares
claimed that it had been defrauded in certain equipment leasing transac-
tions and sought relief from a group of defendants including Crisp, presi-
dent of Crisp Equipment. According to Crisp, the president of Southwest
Bancshares at the time of the transactions was aware of the fraudulent
transactions and was complicitous in the schemes. Crisp therefore argued
the doctrine that when the agent (Southwest Bancshares' president) acts
for both himself and his principal, the agent's knowledge is imputed to the
principal, who will not be allowed to achieve an advantage secured by the
fraud of the agent. The court, however, held that the doctrine was for the
protection of innocent third parties and did not protect those who collude
with the agent to defraud the principal. 70 Finding that the principal,
Southwest, was not chargeable with the fraudulent acts of its agent, the
court affirmed the judgment against the defendants. 7 '
Derivative Suits. In Zauber v. Murray Savings Association72 the plaintiff
Ray Zauber brought a derivative action on behalf of Murray Savings As-
sociation, seeking an accounting for and recovery of assets allegedly con-
verted from Murray Savings to the use and benefit of certain affiliates and
insiders. Both at the time of the alleged wrongful transaction and at the
time the action was filed, Murray Financial Corporation (the parent of
Murray Savings), Zauber, and another individual held the total outstand-
ing stock of Murray Savings Association. After Zauber filed suit, Murray
Financial purchased the other individual's shares. Shortly thereafter,
Murray Savings held a shareholders' meeting that Zauber failed to attend,
during which the shareholders authorized a reverse stock split. Zauber's
stock ownership was reduced to less than one share as a result of the re-
verse split, and he was given cash for his fractional share. Zauber, how-
ever, refused to accept the tendered cash payment. At trial the defendants
claimed that Zauber had not complied with the requirements of the deriv-
67, Id at 413.
68. Id
69. 586 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
70. Id at 615. The court cited a Texas case and a federal case in support of this princi-
ple. See Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 388 F.2d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 1967);
Centennial Mut. Life Ass'n v. Parham, 80 Tex. 518, 527, 16 S.W. 316, 319 (1891).
71. 586 S.W.2d at 615-16.
72. 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 601
SW.2d 940 (Tex. 1980).
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ative action statute, article 5.14(B)(2)(b) of the TBCA,73 and that because
he had ceased to be a shareholder during the pendency of the litigation, he
could not maintain a derivative suit. Furthermore, the defendants con-
tended that the plaintiff was bound by the decision of the board of direc-
tors of Murray Savings not to pursue the action as the decision was made
in the exercise of sound business judgment.
Addressing the defendants' assertions, the court first noted that, pursu-
ant to article 5.14(B), a plaintiff should plead that he has made efforts to
have the board bring suit for the corporation.74 The record indicated that
the plaintiff had made no such demand-on the Murray Savings board. The
court stated, however, that such demand need not be made if it can be
shown that the demand would be futile. The court emphasized that in the
latter case the principal issue was whether the directors could not be ex-
pected to pursue the action diligently because of personal interest in the
controversy or because of control over the board by the alleged wrongdo-
ers.75 The court found that because the defendants' control over the
board, if any, was a genuine issue of fact, so was the plaintiffs standing to
sue.
76
Secondly, the court addressed the argument that, in order to comply
with article 5.14(B)(1), the plaintiff must be a shareholder at the time of the
wrongful transaction. The defendants claimed that the federal rule gov-
erning derivative suits, 77 which is similar to the Texas rule, had been con-
strued to require that the plaintiff maintain shareholder status throughout
the suit. 78 The court, suggesting that the reverse stock split may have been
an involuntary disposal of the plaintiffs shares, ordered that on remand
any finding that the plaintiff had failed to maintain shareholder status de-
pended upon whether the disposition of his stock was voluntary or invol-
untary. 79 In the event the trial court should determine that the disposition
was involuntary, the court stated that the plaintiff would be allowed to
proceed with the suit unless the reverse split was intended to accomplish a
73. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(B) (Vernon 1980) provides:
Prerequisites. A derivative suit may be brought in this State only if:
(i) The plaintiff was a record or beneficial owner of shares. . . at the time
of the transaction of which he complains . . . and
(2) The initial pleading in the suit states:
(a) The ownership required by Subsection (1), and
(b) With particularity, the efforts of the plaintiff to have suit brought for
the corporation by the board of directors, or the reasons for not making any
such efforts.
74. 591 S.W.2d at 936. The court of civil appeals corrected the trial court's misapplica-
tion of TEX. R. Civ. P. 42, dealing with class actions, to derivative suits, and held that the
latter is to be governed instead by art. 5.14(B) of the Texas Business Corporation Act set
forth in note 73 supra. 591 S.W.2d at 935-36.
75. 591 S.W.2d at 937.
76. Id
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
78. 591 S.W.2d at 937. See generally Blackmon v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 540, 169
S.W.2d 962, 964 (1943) (when a Texas statute was taken literally from a federal statute, it
was presumed that the Texas Legislature adopted the statute as construed by federal courts).
79. 591 S.W.2d at 938.
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valid business purpose.80
Finally, the court held that the defendants' contention that the plaintiff
should be bound by the decision of the board of directors not to pursue the
action was not relevant to the plaintiffs right to maintain the suit.8'
Rather, the court returned to the statutory allegation of futility and the fact
question of the defendants' control over the board. 82 According to the
court, if the facts on remand indicated that a demand was required, the
plaintiff would not be allowed to proceed with the action.83 If, however,
the facts indicated that demand was not required, the court held that the
plaintiff could maintain the action despite the decision by the board of
directors. 84
As in Zauber, the Dallas court of civil appeals again addressed the issue
of a shareholder's standing to sue derivatively, 85 but did so only to the
extent necessary to support an action for a temporary injunction. In Sonics
International, Inc. v. Dorchester Enterprises, Inc. 86 the named parties were
principal shareholders of Coastal Plains, Inc. Dorchester brought the de-
rivative suit, challenging a proposed contract between the corporation and
its controlling shareholder, without making a demand on the Coastal
Plains board of directors as required by article 5.14(B). Dorchester
claimed that such efforts would have been futile because a majority of the
board was allied with the defendant Sonics. Sonics contended that the
board had delegated the decision whether the suit should be prosecuted to
an independent special committee, whose decision not to sue was made in
the exercise of sound business judgment and, consequently, was binding
on both Coastal Plains and Dorchester. The court found that the action of
the board and its special committee did not defeat Dorchester's standing to
sue for the purpose of securing a temporary injunction against payment
under the contract. 87 The court held that the trial court would have the
discretion at a later stage of the litigation to determine on the merits what
effect the committee's decision had on Dorchester's right to relief.
88
Effect of Forfeiture of Corporate Charter. In Regal Construction Co. v. Han-
sel89 Regal brought suit against Hansel seeking recovery of the balance
due on an oral contract for remodeling the Hansel residence. Following
institution of the suit, the secretary of state's office in Austin forfeited the
80. Id
81. Id.
82. Id at 938-39. The statute is set out in part at note 73 supra.
83. 591 S.W.2d at 939.
84. Id
85. For other cases involving the power of the board of directors to dismiss a derivative
action under the business judgment rule, see Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,949 (8th Cir.
1979); Lewis v. Anderson, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,153
(9th Cir. 1979).
86. 593 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
87. Id at 392.
88. Id
89. 596 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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corporate charter of Regal for nonpayment of franchise taxes. Because the
forfeiture resulted in a denial of the plaintiffs right to prosecute as a cor-
poration, James Allen, the sole shareholder of Regal, filed an amended
petition seeking recovery as sole shareholder under the cause of action
originally pleaded by Regal. The court recognized that the effect of a char-
ter forfeiture was to prohibit the corporation from doing business in Texas
and to deny it the right to sue in a Texas court.90 Nonetheless, the court
stated:
The legal title to the assets remains in the corporation, but the benefi-
cial title to the assets of the corporation is in the stockholders. This
being true, and since the right to sue has been denied to the corpora-
tion by the forfeiture, the stockholders, as beneficial owners of the
assets of the corporation, may prosecute or defend such actions in the
courts as may be necessary to protect their property rights.9'
The court held that Allen was the beneficial owner of the assets of Regal
and was entitled to intervene in the suit filed by Regal for the purpose of
prosecuting the suit as its sole shareholder. 92
On rehearing, the Hansels contended that the legislature had provided a
statutory method for securing reinstatement of the forfeited corporate
charter and that in the absence of compliance with this procedure the cor-
poration may not sue. The court, however, did not accept the conclusion
that reviving the corporate charter was the only means to proceed with the
litigation, and held that Regal's sole shareholder was not precluded from
suing in his own right.93 Accordingly, rehearing was denied.94
Roylex, Inc. v. Langson Bros. Construction Co. 9 5 dealt with the personal
liability of corporate officers and shareholders after forfeiture of the corpo-
rate charter, as well as related issues under the alter ego theory.96 In an
action to recover on an alleged contract debt, the plaintiff asserted that
because the corporate charter of the defendant construction company had
been forfeited, the shareholders or the officers were personally liable on
the corporation's contractual obligations to the plaintiff. The court rebut-
ted the argument, noting that the contract at issue had been entered into
three years before the date of forfeiture and that the work performed
under it likewise had been completed long before the charter was for-
90. Id at 153.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id. at 156-57; see Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Blankenburg, 149 Tex. 498, 235 S.W.2d
891 (1951) (when corporate charter was forfeited, shareholders as beneficial owners of cor-
porate assets could prosecute or defend in court to protect their property rights); Pratt-Hew-
itt Oil Corp. v. Hewitt, 122 Tex. 38, 52 S.W.2d 64 (1932) (when corporation was unable to
sue to remedy wrongs from directors' fraud, shareholder may sue on behalf of himself and
other shareholders for corporation's benefit). But see TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18,
comment (Vernon 1980) (last para.) (art. 8.18 negates the Pratt-Hewitt decision that allowed
shareholders to sue for a foreign corporation that had not yet obtained a certificate of au-
thority from the state).
94. 596 S.W.2d at 157.
95. 585 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
96. See notes 39-58 supra and accompanying text.
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feited.97 Thus, under the circumstances, the court held that the officers
and shareholders were not personally liable. 98 Regarding the plaintiffs
contention that the corporation was merely the alter ego of the individual
defendants, the court held that the evidence did not merit consideration of
the alter ego issue.99
Jurisdiction. A relatively large number of cases handed down during the
survey period concerned questions of venue or jurisdiction over corpora-
tions, but the cases primarily involved the application of established legal
principles. Most cases dealt with the applicability of the Texas long-arm
statute' 0 to foreign corporations allegedly doing business in Texas, and
the courts generally applied the two-part test, (i) whether the nonresident
defendant is subject to process under the terms of the long-arm statute, and
(ii) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the re-
quirements of due process of law.' 0 '
Wright Waterproofing Co. v. Applied Polymers of America I02 was typical
of the jurisdiction cases. In a suit for breach of warranty on a defective
waterproofing compound, the court reviewed the question of jurisdiction
over a New Jersey corporation with an agent allegedly representing the
corporation in Texas. The court found that Applied Polymers, the defend-
ant, was indeed doing business in Texas within the ambit of the long-arm
statute. 10 3 The court examined three factors to determine whether consti-
tutional due process requirements were met in order to subject the nonresi-
dent defendant to Texas jurisdiction: (1) the foreign corporation purposely
must do some act or consummate some transaction in Texas; (2) the cause
of action must arise from or be connected with such act or transaction; and
(3) the assumption of jurisdiction by Texas courts must not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'°4 In this respect, the
court noted that consideration must be given to "'the quality, nature, and
extent of the activity in [Texas], the relative convenience of the parties, the
benefits and protection of the laws of [Texas] afforded the respective par-
ties, and the basic equities of the situation.' "105 First, the court found that
the acts of the defendant's president in coming to Texas and meeting with
a prospective client constituted purposeful acts within the State of
97. 585 S.W.2d at 773.
98. Id
99. Id. at 772.
100. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981).
101. See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Kitamura Valve Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Tex.
1980) (Japanese corporation was not "doing business" in Texas and had insufficient mini-
mum contacts for jurisdiction); Gutierrez v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (in application of Texas long-arm statute, defendant nonresident corporation was not
amenable to jurisdiction though it had extensive land holdings in Texas and certain of its
subsidiaries resided in Texas).
102. 602 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'dn.r.e.percuriam, 608 S.W.2d 164
(Tex. 1980).
103. Id. at 70.
104. Id at 71.
105. Id. (quoting O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966); Tyee Constr.
Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963)).
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Texas. 106 Secondly, because these acts led to the purchase of the defend-
ant's product by the plaintiff, the court held that the cause of action arose
from the purposeful acts.'0 7 Finally, the court ruled that requiring the de-
fendant to defend in Texas would not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 0 8 Thus, all requirements of due process were
met.
Considerationfor the Issuance of Shares. Emco, Inc. v. Hea '0 9 dealt with
the issue of valid consideration for a corporation's issuance of its stock.
John Healy bought stock in Emco, a small company that manufactured
outdoor lighting fixtures, with financing arranged by First Trust and Sav-
ings Bank of Davenport, Iowa. Healy agreed to purchase 3,334 shares of
Emco common stock and gave a note payable to Emco for $50,000, pledg-
ing the 3,334 shares as security for the note. Emco immediately assigned
the note and security agreement with recourse to the bank and received the
proceeds in return. Healy defaulted on the note, and the bank called upon
Emco for performance. Emco paid the note, took a reassignment from the
bank, and filed suit against Healy. At trial Emco argued that because the
corporation actually received money in consideration for the issuance of its
stock, it received full value for Healy's note when the note was transferred
to the Davenport bank and, therefore, did not violate the Texas constitu-
tional and statutory provisions regarding the issuance of corporate
stock."l 0 The court disagreed, however, stating that because Emco's as-
signment of the note to the bank was with full recourse it amounted to no
more than a loan advance by the bank on the collateral of the note. I I The
court stated the following rule: "Where a note is transferred by the corpo-
ration to a third party and the corporation still remains secondarily or con-
tingently liable on the note, the stock is not considered paid for."" 12 The
106. 602 S.W.2d at 71.
107. Id
108. Id.
109. 602 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
110. TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 6 provides: "No corporation shall issue stock or bonds ex-
cept for money paid, labor done or property actually received, and all ficticious increase of
stock or indebtedness shall be void." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.16 (Vernon 1980)provides: A. The consideration paid for the issuance of shares shall consist of money
paid, labor done, or property actually received. Shares may not be issued un-
til the full amount of consideration, fixed as provided by law, has been paid.
When such consideration shall have been paid to the corporation or to a cor-
poration of which all of the outstanding shares of each class are owned by the
corporation, the shares shall be deemed to have been issued and the subscriber
or shareholder entitled to receive such issue shall be a shareholder with respect
to such shares, and the shares shall be considered fully paid and non-assessa-
ble.
B. Neither promissory notes nor the promise of future services shall con-
stitute payment or part payment for shares of a corporation.
111. 602 S.W.2d at 312. The court also rejected Emco's contention that because the note
was secured by the stock itself, it constituted "property actually received" in accordance with
constitutional and statutory requirements. Id at 313.
112. Id at 312 (citation omitted).
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court therefore affirmed the trial court's holding that the note in the hands
of Emco was unenforceable."13
Foreign Corporations. Article 8.18 of the TBCA 114 prohibits foreign cor-
porations that are transacting or have transacted business in the state with-
out a certificate of authority from maintaining any action, suit, or
proceeding in any court of the state. In Squyres Construction Co. v. Chemi-
calBank" 5 the court held that plaintiff Chemical Bank, a foreign corpora-
tion, could bring suit in Texas for a deficiency due after repossession and
sale of equipment under a lease agreement without violating article
8.18.'16 The court stated at the outset that the burden was on the defend-
ant to plead and prove facts indicating that the plaintiff was a foreign cor-
poration that could not maintain a suit, particularly when such facts did
not affirmatively appear in the plaintiffs petition." 17 Furthermore, the
court found that the lease document stated that the agreement was
"'deemed to have been made in New York,'" that the plaintiff had no
duty to perform any act in Texas concerning the leased equipment, and
that rental payments were payable to the bank in New York."18 Accord-
ingly, the court found that the appellants failed to prove that the plaintiff
transacted business in Texas so as to be barred from maintaining the
suit. '19
Sale of Assets. In Padre Sands, Inc. v. Cawood 20 the issue was whether a
listing agreement for the sale of a corporation's property was void due to
the selling corporation's failure to acquire the consent of two-thirds of the
shareholders as required by article 5.10(A)(3) of the TBCA.' 21 Jack
Cawood, a real estate broker, sued Padre Sands for a commission pursuant
to a listing agreement covering tracts owned by Padre Sands that then con-
stituted its sole assets. The listing agreement was executed by Padre Sands'
president and secretary-treasurer, who subsequently received authoriza-
tion from the board of directors to enter into the listing agreement. After a
prospective purchaser procured by Cawood signed a contract of sale, Pa-
dre Sands failed to execute the contract and did not pay Cawood his com-
mission under the agreement. Padre Sands argued that because holders of
113. Id. at 313.
114. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1980).
115. 596 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1980, no writ).
116. Id at 284. The bank obtained rights in the lease agreement by assignment from the
lessor, Advanced Leasing Services.
117. Id; see Ero Indus., Inc. v. Be-In Buttons Co., 473 S.W.2d 667, 679 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, no writ).
118. 596 S.W.2d at 284.
119. Id The court also noted that the plaintiff could maintain the action according to
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.01 (Vernon 1980), which provides that creating evidences
of debt is not considered to be transacting business in the state. 596 S.W.2d at 284.
120. 595 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
121. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10(A)(3) (Vernon 1980) requires two-thirds con-
sent of the holders of the outstanding shares of the corporation for any "sale, lease, ex-
change, or other disposition. . . of all, or substantially all, the property and assets. . . of a
corporation."
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the requisite two-thirds of the shares of the corporation had refused to
consummate the proposed sale, the agreement was illegal under article
5.10 and, therefore, no commission was due. The court, focusing on the
issue of whether the listing agreement was within the purview of article
5.10, noted that such an agreement did not obligate the owner to convey
title or any interest in the land but was merely a method of soliciting a
ready, willing, and able purchaser. 122 Consequently, the court held that
the agreement was not a sale, lease, exchange, or other dispositional con-
tract under article 5.10, and that because the agreement was not void,
plaintiff was entitled to recover his brokerage commission.123
Indemnification. In the case of Texas Society v. Fort Bend Chapter12 4 the
Fort Bend Chapter of the National Society, Daughters of the American
Revolution sued the Texas Society, Daughters of the American Revolu-
tion, Inc. and its officers for misuse of the nonprofit corporation's funds.
The officers were being sued in another action for fraud and conspiracy in
dealing with the Society's assets, and the primary issue in the case at bar
was whether the Texas Society was justified in selling its assets to pay the
attorneys' fees of its officers prior to a court determination that the officers
were innocent. The court stated that pursuant to article 2.22 of the Texas
Non-Profit Corporation Act' 25 the corporation could indemnify the of-
ficers for actual legal expenses and costs incurred in their defense action
only after a final determination that they were not guilty of negligence or
misconduct. 126 Thus, the court upheld the trial court's temporary injunc-
tion to preserve the corporation's assets.' 27 On motion for rehearing, the
court emphasized that the right to indemnification does not arise from the
common law, but rather is purely statutory, and the court stated that no
statutory provision authorizes the advancement of expenses in connection
with litigation against corporate officers.' 28 Alternately, the court rea-
soned that a corporate officer breaches his fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion when he diverts its assets to his personal use and accordingly he is
liable for such misuse. 129 The motion for rehearing was denied.130
Shareholder Agreements. In Wh'taker v. Vastine 13 1 the individual parties
to the suit owned all the stock in Bag 'N' Baggage, Inc. in the following
122. 595 S.W.2d at 899.
123. Id. The court suggested that the officers of the corporation could have provided in
the listing agreement that the payment of the sales commission was subject to the approval
of the sale by two-thirds of the shareholders. Id
124. 590 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
125. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.22 (Vernon 1980).
126. 590 S.W.2d at 159.
127. Id.
128. Id at 164. Actually, the statute permissively authorizes indemnification without
stating when it may be granted. The statute does make an exception from indemnification
for those found guilty of misconduct or negligence, thus necessitating by implication a final
adjudication to determine whether the individuals fall within the exception.
129. Id
130. Id at 166.
131. 601 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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percentages: appellant Andrew Whitaker, 51%; appellee William Vastine,
25%; and appellee Charles Whitaker, 24%. In January 1978 the parties
executed an agreement providing that any future acquisition of Bag 'N'
Baggage stock by them would be made in the following percentages: An-
drew Whitaker, 49%; Vastine, 25.5%; and Charles Whitaker, 25.5%. Later
that year, stock certificates were issued to Vastine and Charles Whitaker,
supposedly in accordance with the agreement, representing shares of stock
sufficient to bring the ownership percentages of the three shareholders in
line with the agreement. This issuance triggered a conflict among the par-
ties concerning interpretation of the agreement's stock ownership terms.
Andrew Whitaker argued that the percentages applied only to stock ac-
quired subsequent to the agreement, while Vastine and Charles Whitaker
maintained that the contractual percentages were intended to establish the
current ratios in which the individuals would own shares in the corpora-
tion and consequently, the issuance of stock certificates was required to
achieve the new ownership percentages. Andrew Whitaker filed suit to
have the stock certificates issued to Charles Whitaker and Vastine can-
celled or reissued in the proportions outlined in the 1978 agreement, but
the trial court dismissed the action. On appeal Andrew Whitaker claimed
that issuance of the certificates without authorization from the board of
directors violated the corporation's bylaws as well as Texas law.' 32 The
court agreed with appellant's contention and stated the law: "When the
shareholders of a corporation vest power in a board of directors, issuance
of stock can only be authorized at a valid meeting of the board, regularly
called." 133 The court, noting that no other theory had been presented to
support the issuance of the certificates, concluded that because such issu-
ance was not authorized, the certificates were void and the shares should
be cancelled.' 34
III. SECURITIES REGULATION
In addition to the $100,000-purchase exemptive regulation promulgated
by the State Securities Board during 1980,135 the board promulgated rules
late in the survey period that ease regulatory burdens. For example, the
board adopted a rule permitting directors, officers, agents, and employees
of an issuer to answer offeree questions under Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 146136 without requiring them to register as dealers,
agents, or salespersons under the Texas Securities Act. 137 More impor-
132. Appellant also argued that the stock was issued before consideration was fully paid
in violation of TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 6 and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1353 (Vernon
1980), which prohibit the issuance of stock except for money paid or property received. The
court, however, failed to address this argument.
133. 601 S.W.2d at 403 (citations omitted).
134. Id
135. See notes 4-10 supra and accompanying text.
136. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1980).
137. See Tex. Blue Sky Reg. 065.08.00.001(0, 5 Tex. Reg. 3000 (1980), 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 55,591 (1980). The Texas Securities Act is codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. arts. 581-1 to -39 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981).
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tantly, the board adopted a "blue chip" exemption from registration for
sales of securities of issuers whose performance and financial stability meet
specified criteria drawn from the registration provisions of the Texas Se-
curities Act.138 Also, the original rule on advertising was repealed and
replaced by new "Guidelines for Regulation of Offers,"' 39 and the disclo-
sure standards for tender offers were updated.140
In the courts, litigation once again ensued regarding the definition of a
security. In Wilson v. Lee ' 4' the appellants had purchased from Claude R.
McClennahan, Inc. interests in a joint venture that was to hold certain
tracts of land for appreciation and resale. The property acquired by the
joint venture was located in a remote rural area where any immediate use
was limited to farming and pasturage. According to the record, the appel-
lants never contemplated the generation of any profit in the joint venture
through development or operation of the property. The corporation had
been designated manager of the joint venture, but its only managerial ac-
tivities consisted of protecting, preserving, and maintaining the property in
a condition suitable for resale. The participant's ownership agreement
provided that sixty percent of the interest owners could change the nomi-
nee title holder of the property to an entity of their choice at any time, that
certain actions required unanimous consent of all owners, and that the
right to direct joint venture operations was vested in the owners of sixty
percent in interest. The appellants brought an action under the Texas Se-
curities Act that relied heavily on the allegation that they had been sold a
"security" as defined under the Act. 142 Consequently, the only issue
before the court of appeals was whether the joint venture in land consti-
tuted a "security."
Focusing on the manner in which the venture earned income, the court
looked to the United States Supreme Court for guidance in determining
the existence of a security: "'The test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come so/ely
from the efforts of others.' "143 The court also approved a broader state-
138. See Texas Blue Sky Reg. 065.20.00.003, 5 Tex. Reg. 4146 (1980), 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 55,713 (1980). This exemptive provision, effective Oct. 29, 1980, exempts sales
of securities by the issuer if, briefly stated: (i) the securities are senior to or on a parity with a
class of the issuer's securities registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78/ (1976); (ii) the issuer has not had any material defaults in the last seven years
on payment of indebtedness or long-term lease rentals; (iii) the issuer's net income for four
of the last five years was at least one million dollars each year, and net income for the
preceding year was at least one-and-one-half times the corporation's expected interest ex-
pense; (iv) the securities to be issued, if stock, have certain voting rights; (v) the securities, if
common stock, are held by at least 1,200 persons with at least 750,000 shares outstanding
and have an aggregate market value of $3,750,000 or more. Id
139. Tex. Blue Sky Reg. 065.17.00.100-.700, 5 Tex. Reg. 3046 (1980), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 55,694A-G (1980).
140. See Tex. Blue Sky Reg. 065.15.00.500, 5 Tex. Reg. 3045 (1980), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
55,678 (1980).
141. 601 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ filed).
142. For a definition of "security" under the Act, see TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
581-4(A) (Vernon 1964).
143. 601 S.W.2d at 485 (emphasis by court) (quoting SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301
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ment by the Supreme Court that a security involves "a reasonable expecta-
tion of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others.'" 144 Applying this lenient test, the court found that no management
efforts were directed toward making a profit, and that the owners expected
market inflation alone to be the determinant of any increase in value. 45
Furthermore, the court found no merit in the contention that the property
caretaking efforts of the investors and others were a determinative factor in
finding a security. 146 Finally, the court cited McConathy v. Dal Mac Com-
mercial Real Estate, Inc. 147 as applicable to the fact situation at hand. The
McConathy court held that a joint venture to acquire and hold land for
appreciation, without relying on the developmental or managerial skills of
another, was more akin to a partnership and was not within the definition
of a security. 148 Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court
and held that an investment with others in raw land with the expectation
of appreciation solely by market inflation was not the purchase of a "secur-
ity." 149
Similarly, in Adickes v. Andreoli'50 the court dealt with the issue of
whether an interest in a real estate limited partnership represented a secur-
ity. Andreoli purchased an interest in a limited partnership for the pur-
pose of land speculation, as in Wilson, and brought an action for rescission
under the Texas Securities Act and common law principles of fraud. The
court again analyzed the McConathy decision and relied on the proposi-
tion that state securities laws are not involved when several persons join
and furnish part of the purchase price of real property. The court found
that the interest in question was not an "instrument representing or se-
cured by an interest in the capital, property, assets, profits or earnings of a
company,''151 and, in accordance with the result in Wilson, stated: "We
find no evidence that it was the expectation of the parties that the success
of the venture would depend on those 'essential managerial efforts ...
which effect the failure or success of the enterprise.' "152
(1946)). The quoted language is the Court's definition of an "investment contract" as that
term is used under the federal securities acts.
144. 601 S.W.2d at 485 (emphasis by court) (quoting United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
145. 601 S.W.2d at 486.
146. Id Appellants had argued that a security existed in this case just as it did in those
cases involving pyramid selling schemes. The court, however, could not accept the analogy
because the "efforts" in the case at bar were not significant enough to generate profits.
147. 545 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
148. Id at 875. Numerous authorities contained in the McConathy opinion support the
rule that the mere holding of property in anticipation of appreciation is insufficient to find a
security. Id. The courts apparently require a more substantive showing of "efforts."
149. 601 S.W.2d at 487.
150. 600 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1980, writ filed).
151. 600 S.W.2d at 945 (citations omitted).
152. Id (citations omitted).
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